In 1985, Stephen M. Walt (from Foreign Policy and The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy) published an article in International Security titled "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power".
Speaking to idea that states either balance --join with another state
against a growing threat-- or bandwagon --join with the threat
to guarantee survival--, Walt's theory of international relations (IR),
now called Balance of Threat theory, postulates that 4 distinct threats
shape alliance formation in IR:
1) Aggregate Power- total combined resources of a state greatly exceeds others
2) Proximate Power- location of a threat shapes alliances for neighboring states
3) Offensive Power- military capabilities of a state
4) Offensive Intentions- an aggressive/expansionist foreign policy
When these threats are applied to the balancing/bandwagoning argument Walt proposes two different hypotheses:
Balancing- "If balancing is the dominant tendency [in IR], then threatening states will provoke others to align against them... Credibility [of allies] is less important in a balancing world because one's allies will resist threatening states out of their own self-interest, not because they expect others to do it for them."
Bandwagoning- "If states tend to ally with the strongest and most threatening state, then powers will be rewarded if they appear both strong and potentially dangerous. International rivalries will be more intense, because a single defeat may signal the decline of one side and the ascendancy of the other... Moreover, if statesmen believe that bandwagoning is widespread, they will be more inclined to use force to resolve international disputes. This is because they will both fear the gains that others may make by demonstrating their power or resolve, and because they will assume that others will be unlikely to balance against them."
Following this, Walt goes on to say that, historically, balancing is the norm (example- France/Russia vs. Germany/Austria-Hungary in WWI); however, bandwagoning occasionally occurs (example- Finland/USSR during the Cold War).
The balance/bandwagon argument becomes complicated with the addition of ideology. In much political rhetoric, especially during the Cold War, ideological birds of a feather, indeed, flocked together; yet, through the examples of international communism and pan-arabism Walt also notes that birds of a feather can fly apart:
International Communism supposed that Moscow was the vanguard, and
it exercised it's global influence accordingly; however, as China became
more powerful it began to break away from Moscow's influence
culminating in the Sino-Soviet split. In Yugoslavia, Tito also split
from the Soviet Union with the idea that there are many roads to
socialism.
Likewise Pan-Arabic ideology, despite the obvious cultural commonalities
between middle eastern countries, could never really take off.
Pan-Arabism required states to relinquish their power to become part of
the larger picture, but the problem was to whom would power
be relinquished? Nasser's Egypt or Saddam Hussein's Ba'athism? In the
end no consensus was reached, and with Nasser's death the experiment
also died.
I wish to apply the two above examples to our modern international climate. More specifically, I want to address how the United States, by subsidizing the defense of Europe with NATO, has elicited a bandwagoning response by EU nations and others. I must give credit to Walt in his assertion that balancing against power is the historical norm; however, norms do change with time. Starting in 1945 through the collapse of the Soviet Union to present, bandwagoning has been the normal response to the United States in it's alliances.
Much of this argument extends from other portions of Walt's paper. He cites "bribery" as a leading cause for states to form/remain in alliances. To quote Walt on bribery, "the provision of economic or military assistance will create effective allies, either by demonstrating one's own favorable intentions, by invoking a sense of gratitude, or because the recipient will become dependent on the donor." He goes on to highlight the big problems with buying allies:
1) That in a world with multiple superpowers a recipient who is displeased with the aid it is receiving can get it elsewhere.
2) Recipients will try harder to get more aid because they are weaker than the one providing it, and if the provider feels that stopping the aid will lead to vulnerability, they are more reluctant to cut the funding.
3) The more important the ally is to the provider; the more aid it will receive. This gives the smaller state a substantial advantage for bargaining when it knows it's own importance.
4) By providing aid, the weaker state gains more strength and, eventually, has less need to follow the provider's wishes.
Throughout the Cold War, the United States was the sole protector of Europe. At the time it made sense for the United States, being relatively unscathed by the second world war, to defend Europe. It allowed European nations to place a limited amount of resources in defense spending freeing up the funds for rebuilding their economies. It made the dollar, based on gold, the international standard, propelling the US to new heights of wealth and prosperity. Finally, it took away much of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union because, if one American were killed, it would be all out war.
However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact left NATO in an identity crisis. It's use as a balancing force against the Warsaw Pact ended. So instead of completely restructuring itself, allowing the EU to take over the function of collective defense; it expanded becoming an offensive instrument of Washington's foreign policy with Europe bandwagoning because of dependence.
This can be seen by NATO's roll in Afghanistan. If troop commitments to a conflict are taken as a test for bandwagoning behavior in an alliance, coalition forces that are not US military personnel account for a minimal number of soldiers on the ground. As of 6 Jan 2012, 90,000 (69%) of the total 130,386 soldiers in the ISAF are US forces. That means the remaining 40,386 (31%) of the total are from the other 49 nations in the coalition. Naturally many of these nations can not afford to contribute more; they are artificially weak from dependence on American personnel for 67 years.
In the Korean War 341,600 men made up the United Nations Security Council force; 300,000 (88%) were US personnel. In Vietnam the total international troop count was 601,100; of this, 536,100 (89%) were US personnel. In both cases, the governments of Europe bandwagoned with the US as it balanced the communist threat on their doorsteps. With the removal of that threat in 1991, international support for US foreign policy objectives has plummeted.
This is where the failed examples of bribery --international communism and pan-arabism-- enter the discussion. When subordinates of the Soviet Union or unified Arabic states had enough power to "fly apart" or step out of line with the ideological leader, they did. That split is happening with our allies now.
Despite the economic woes of the Eurozone, the EU economy remains larger than that of the United States. According to the 2011 CIA World Factbook, the EU's economy is 15.39 trillion dollars compared to the United States' $15.05 trillion. Without threat from communism they no longer need us, the only reason we have not yet fully lost their support is because we give them a free ride on defense spending. In order to be a member of NATO, states are supposed to spend 2% of their GDP on defense.
In a 2011 article to The Daily Caller, the Cato Institute's Ted Carpenter highlighted the problem caused by bribing Europe:
"...even before the economic crisis led to drastic budget slashing, spending levels in several countries (including such major allies as Germany and Italy) were closer to one percent of GDP than two. And matters have gotten worse in the past two years. The $700 billion US defense budget now accounts for an astonishing 74 percent of total spending by NATO members. The other 26 members of the alliance spend a mere $220 billion-- despite having a collective economy larger than that of the United States."
So, if Europe bandwagons with the United States because of dependency, and if we believe Walt's theory that a bandwagoning world is substantially less safe than a balancing world, then we must evaluate whether NATO is costly or beneficial to the United States.
As seen above, financially, it is not. And in these economic dire straights, that reason should be paramount. Beyond that and within the last two years, we have also witnessed a new phenomenon: Europe championing regime change, but expecting the United States to fight the battle, as was the case in Libya and will soon be the case in Syria. Yes, in each case the leaders are/were terrible men; however, if Europe wants the fight so bad, let them do it without our help. The United States needs to get its economic house of cards in order domestically before spending itself into oblivion by policing the world. Moreover, (and repeating Walt's argument) if we really want a safer world, we need to let our birds fly apart.
One would think that this is easier said than done, but really it could be accomplished fairly easily keeping Europe safe and allowing the US economy to recover. The biggest problem is appeasing our own Military Industrial Complex (MIC), but even that can be done. If we sold our European bases, and their subsequent fighter/bomber/support wings this whole problem would be solved. The aircraft we field in Europe are all outdated, built in the 70's and 80's. However, each year we spend billions refitting and updating them. If Europe took over their maintenance, then the MIC would be satisfied as they would still receive revenue for parts and maintenance. Europe would be safe because all of a sudden it would have it's own military capabilities again. The United States would be more secure economically, and again, the MIC would be satisfied because we could focus efforts at home on building more advanced aircraft, making our own nation even safer than it is now. We would not necessarily have to leave NATO, but our membership as well as Europe's would finally reach a point of balance and safety for the first time in 67 years. This is the logical step, and one that should be taken before our house of cards collapses
1) Aggregate Power- total combined resources of a state greatly exceeds others
2) Proximate Power- location of a threat shapes alliances for neighboring states
3) Offensive Power- military capabilities of a state
4) Offensive Intentions- an aggressive/expansionist foreign policy
When these threats are applied to the balancing/bandwagoning argument Walt proposes two different hypotheses:
Balancing- "If balancing is the dominant tendency [in IR], then threatening states will provoke others to align against them... Credibility [of allies] is less important in a balancing world because one's allies will resist threatening states out of their own self-interest, not because they expect others to do it for them."
Bandwagoning- "If states tend to ally with the strongest and most threatening state, then powers will be rewarded if they appear both strong and potentially dangerous. International rivalries will be more intense, because a single defeat may signal the decline of one side and the ascendancy of the other... Moreover, if statesmen believe that bandwagoning is widespread, they will be more inclined to use force to resolve international disputes. This is because they will both fear the gains that others may make by demonstrating their power or resolve, and because they will assume that others will be unlikely to balance against them."
Following this, Walt goes on to say that, historically, balancing is the norm (example- France/Russia vs. Germany/Austria-Hungary in WWI); however, bandwagoning occasionally occurs (example- Finland/USSR during the Cold War).
The balance/bandwagon argument becomes complicated with the addition of ideology. In much political rhetoric, especially during the Cold War, ideological birds of a feather, indeed, flocked together; yet, through the examples of international communism and pan-arabism Walt also notes that birds of a feather can fly apart:
I wish to apply the two above examples to our modern international climate. More specifically, I want to address how the United States, by subsidizing the defense of Europe with NATO, has elicited a bandwagoning response by EU nations and others. I must give credit to Walt in his assertion that balancing against power is the historical norm; however, norms do change with time. Starting in 1945 through the collapse of the Soviet Union to present, bandwagoning has been the normal response to the United States in it's alliances.
Much of this argument extends from other portions of Walt's paper. He cites "bribery" as a leading cause for states to form/remain in alliances. To quote Walt on bribery, "the provision of economic or military assistance will create effective allies, either by demonstrating one's own favorable intentions, by invoking a sense of gratitude, or because the recipient will become dependent on the donor." He goes on to highlight the big problems with buying allies:
1) That in a world with multiple superpowers a recipient who is displeased with the aid it is receiving can get it elsewhere.
2) Recipients will try harder to get more aid because they are weaker than the one providing it, and if the provider feels that stopping the aid will lead to vulnerability, they are more reluctant to cut the funding.
3) The more important the ally is to the provider; the more aid it will receive. This gives the smaller state a substantial advantage for bargaining when it knows it's own importance.
4) By providing aid, the weaker state gains more strength and, eventually, has less need to follow the provider's wishes.
Throughout the Cold War, the United States was the sole protector of Europe. At the time it made sense for the United States, being relatively unscathed by the second world war, to defend Europe. It allowed European nations to place a limited amount of resources in defense spending freeing up the funds for rebuilding their economies. It made the dollar, based on gold, the international standard, propelling the US to new heights of wealth and prosperity. Finally, it took away much of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union because, if one American were killed, it would be all out war.
However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact left NATO in an identity crisis. It's use as a balancing force against the Warsaw Pact ended. So instead of completely restructuring itself, allowing the EU to take over the function of collective defense; it expanded becoming an offensive instrument of Washington's foreign policy with Europe bandwagoning because of dependence.
This can be seen by NATO's roll in Afghanistan. If troop commitments to a conflict are taken as a test for bandwagoning behavior in an alliance, coalition forces that are not US military personnel account for a minimal number of soldiers on the ground. As of 6 Jan 2012, 90,000 (69%) of the total 130,386 soldiers in the ISAF are US forces. That means the remaining 40,386 (31%) of the total are from the other 49 nations in the coalition. Naturally many of these nations can not afford to contribute more; they are artificially weak from dependence on American personnel for 67 years.
In the Korean War 341,600 men made up the United Nations Security Council force; 300,000 (88%) were US personnel. In Vietnam the total international troop count was 601,100; of this, 536,100 (89%) were US personnel. In both cases, the governments of Europe bandwagoned with the US as it balanced the communist threat on their doorsteps. With the removal of that threat in 1991, international support for US foreign policy objectives has plummeted.
This is where the failed examples of bribery --international communism and pan-arabism-- enter the discussion. When subordinates of the Soviet Union or unified Arabic states had enough power to "fly apart" or step out of line with the ideological leader, they did. That split is happening with our allies now.
Despite the economic woes of the Eurozone, the EU economy remains larger than that of the United States. According to the 2011 CIA World Factbook, the EU's economy is 15.39 trillion dollars compared to the United States' $15.05 trillion. Without threat from communism they no longer need us, the only reason we have not yet fully lost their support is because we give them a free ride on defense spending. In order to be a member of NATO, states are supposed to spend 2% of their GDP on defense.
In a 2011 article to The Daily Caller, the Cato Institute's Ted Carpenter highlighted the problem caused by bribing Europe:
"...even before the economic crisis led to drastic budget slashing, spending levels in several countries (including such major allies as Germany and Italy) were closer to one percent of GDP than two. And matters have gotten worse in the past two years. The $700 billion US defense budget now accounts for an astonishing 74 percent of total spending by NATO members. The other 26 members of the alliance spend a mere $220 billion-- despite having a collective economy larger than that of the United States."
So, if Europe bandwagons with the United States because of dependency, and if we believe Walt's theory that a bandwagoning world is substantially less safe than a balancing world, then we must evaluate whether NATO is costly or beneficial to the United States.
As seen above, financially, it is not. And in these economic dire straights, that reason should be paramount. Beyond that and within the last two years, we have also witnessed a new phenomenon: Europe championing regime change, but expecting the United States to fight the battle, as was the case in Libya and will soon be the case in Syria. Yes, in each case the leaders are/were terrible men; however, if Europe wants the fight so bad, let them do it without our help. The United States needs to get its economic house of cards in order domestically before spending itself into oblivion by policing the world. Moreover, (and repeating Walt's argument) if we really want a safer world, we need to let our birds fly apart.
One would think that this is easier said than done, but really it could be accomplished fairly easily keeping Europe safe and allowing the US economy to recover. The biggest problem is appeasing our own Military Industrial Complex (MIC), but even that can be done. If we sold our European bases, and their subsequent fighter/bomber/support wings this whole problem would be solved. The aircraft we field in Europe are all outdated, built in the 70's and 80's. However, each year we spend billions refitting and updating them. If Europe took over their maintenance, then the MIC would be satisfied as they would still receive revenue for parts and maintenance. Europe would be safe because all of a sudden it would have it's own military capabilities again. The United States would be more secure economically, and again, the MIC would be satisfied because we could focus efforts at home on building more advanced aircraft, making our own nation even safer than it is now. We would not necessarily have to leave NATO, but our membership as well as Europe's would finally reach a point of balance and safety for the first time in 67 years. This is the logical step, and one that should be taken before our house of cards collapses
Resource: Foreign Fallacies
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